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"drainage, drainage, DRAINAGE" 
CREATING NATURAL DISASTERS 
IN SOUTHEASTERN NEBRASKA 
WILLIAM KEITH GUTHRIE 
In May 1950 the Little Nemaha River valley 
in the southeastern quadrant of Nebraska suf-
fered a record-breaking flood. For a short time 
at the town of Syracuse, the Little Nemaha 
River, which drained a watershed of 218 square 
miles, had an estimated discharge of 225,000 
cubic feet per second. This was larger than 
any flood recorded since 1928 on the Missouri 
River at Omaha, which drained a watershed of 
322,000 square miles.! During this storm and 
flood twenty-three people lost their lives, four-
teen in the Little Nemaha Valley. As night 
came on, floodwaters swept a commercial bus 
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off a highway northwest of Syracuse; only three 
of nine in the bus would survive. A young 
mother and father had their two infant sons 
torn from their arms as they abandoned their 
automobile on a nearby minor tributary. At 
daybreak, sixty miles downriver at Auburn, a 
family of four on their way to a funeral in 
Kansas had their car stall out on an approach 
to a bridge over the Little Nemaha. Witnesses 
saw the waters take them one by one. These 
deaths were only the most visible manifesta-
tions of the disaster. Homes, businesses, ve-
hicles, and domestic livestock were lost. 
Sloping fields on uplands lost topsoil in depths 
"up to the plow sole"; fields down on the flood 
plain would be covered at places by five feet of 
thi~ topsoil. Railroads, bridges, and roads suf-
fered severe damage. People were stranded in 
attics as their houses floated downstream; some 
spent horrifying hours lodged high up in trees, 
hoping floating debris would miss them. One 
family between Syracuse and Auburn was 
barely able to remain safe for seven hours on 
the tiny island that was the roof of their pickup 
truck. 2 It was a situation way beyond human 
control. Most people would consider it a clear 
example of natural disaster. 
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Here I examine the history of flooding on 
the Little Nemaha as a case study of human 
relationships to a common form of natural 
hazard. Through the history of human re-
sponses to a particular river in flood, I also 
seek understanding of the variety of human 
roles in creating natural disaster out of this 
common hazard of flooding. Natural hazards 
exist when humans have made themselves 
vulnerable to nature's forces. As I am using 
the term, "natural disaster" refers to the situa-
tion after the hazard has fulfilled its potential-
ity, that is, after natural forces have negatively 
impacted humans. The Little Nemaha affords 
a useful vehicle for studying these relation-
ships because of its history of repeated flood-
ing. The record-breaking 1950 flood is not 
important simply as a case of an extreme natu-
ral event. It derives part of its instructive power 
for us (and for Syracuse residents) because 
people expended such effort protecting them-
selves from flooding. The lesson residents 
might have taken from the event was that they 
could ill afford to ignore a river's natural pro-
pensity to flood. Had they considered this care-
fully, it might have challenged their confidence 
in the adequacy of using technology to re-
engineer natural processes. 
NATURAL DISASTERS 
Human complicity in a natural hazard, while 
being a cause, is also a result; it arises from 
something else. I argue that one type of natu-
ral disaster followed from basic human per-
ceptions toward, and use of, nature. Floods do 
not start without unusually intense or pro-
longed precipitation (discounting dam breaks). 
The record-breaking 1950 Syracuse flood fol-
lowed from extraordinary (though not record) 
rainfall amounts on two watersheds that con-
verged on Syracuse at the same time. Other 
floods on this river also began with good rains, 
and, in fact, some storms on the river have 
had greater total amounts, and higher rates of 
precipitation, than during this flood. While 
southeast Nebraska is primarily rural without 
large centers of population, the people who do 
live in the Little Nemaha Valley have made 
themselves particularly vulnerable. They have 
done so through both their settlement pat-
terns (living in a flood plain) and land usage 
(farming row crops on marginal prairie land). 
Unfortunately, in arriving at causation for 
natural disaster, a model of natural disaster as 
an extreme environmental event meeting a 
vulnerable human population (as a function 
of size or usage) is not quite complete. An 
entry here may be through the phrase "nature 
is neutral." Is it not the point that for humans 
nature is not neutral? It is not neutral on two 
sides of our event. Nature created conditions 
which humans found attractive: rich farmland 
on flood plains and amenable transportation 
route possibilities. This is not a perceived neu-
tral nature, it is a beneficent nature. And what 
of the event itself? During or after a flood, 
nature is anything but neutral. Humans often 
perceive it as a malevolent force. Nature is an 
entity divorced from its beneficent aspect in 
human perception. It calls for responses both 
immediate and long term. And the repeated 
experience of flooding in Southeastern Ne-
braska brought changes in human responses. 
But the responses also fell within carefully cir-
cumscribed limits. I would contend that the 
inhabitants' responses flowed from their basic 
perceptions toward, and use of, nature. 
Simply put, nature was a commodity to be 
used for human purposes. Euro-American set-
tlers' use of the land for commercial agricul-
ture led to worse flooding. This view is in stark 
contrast to eastern Nebraska's Native Ameri-
can land usage patterns. Euro-Americans built 
their towns along the river's edge to service 
the railroad (as entrepots for farm produce). 
They made roads and bridges that linked farms, 
towns, railroads, and eventually world mar-
kets. It was a system designed for efficiency. 
The locations chosen discounted nature in two 
aspects: the nature of the land and the nature 
of the river. The land-use practices of the set-
tlers all too often were nonsustainable, creat-
ing conditions which led to soil loss through 
sheet erosion, and incidentally, increased se-
verity of flooding. Their actions on the land 
thus changed the river. The river was not a 
static entity; it did not always stay in its chan-
nel-it never had. But the roads, railroads, 
and towns were built as though it did. And 
when it came up, and came up faster and higher 
due to human land-use practices, the valley's 
residents were swimming in consequences. 
The first solution was to make a "better" 
river, a more efficient river. If valley residents 
had too much water in their towns, the solu-
tion was to get rid of it faster than it came in. 
They straightened and shortened the river 
through channelization. This worked, after a 
fashion, but led to its own consequences. 
Channelization provided a measure of false 
security, encouraging further development 
subject to flooding; it also led to unintended 
channel dynamics. Eventually channelization 
created increased damage downstream. But the 
commercial agricultural system was so profit-
able they would not seriously consider remov-
ing themselves from danger; people kept trying 
to engineer safety. 
Cultural perceptions of nature guided hu-
man choices on both sides of the disaster: first, 
by perceiving that nature was amenable to 
human exploitation, with little regard for the 
consequences, then attempting solutions di-
vorced from what had created the disaster in 
the first place. Valley residents unwittingly 
designed a relationship to nature that made 
themselves particularly vulnerable to natural 
hazard. 
STRUCTURE AND HISTORICAL DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE LITTLE NEMAHA VALLEY 
By the twentieth century, Euro-American 
settlers had formed the essential structure of 
their built environment in relationship to the 
river that still exists today. The major road 
systems formed a "T," with Syracuse lying at 
the juncture. Turning right on State Highway 
2 (the top of the T) took residents to the grain 
elevators in Nebraska City, twenty miles to 
the east. There prodigious quantities of agri-
cultural produce could be moved efficiently 
down the Missouri. Turning left, State High-
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way 2 took them the thirty-three miles to Lin-
coln, the state capital. On the way they passed 
through other towns carrying names some of 
their forebears brought with them from New 
York: Unadilla, then Palmyra. The railroad, 
which had preceded the state highway and 
was so important to the development of the 
upper Little Nemaha Valley, also followed the 
top of the T. 
But before there was a T there was the river 
itself. From its headwaters near Bennett in 
this approximately sixty-mile-long valley, the 
river meandered along eastward, nearing the 
railroad and highway at Palmyra, and again at 
Unadilla, there turning southeastward on its 
way to Syracuse. Below Syracuse it flowed four-
teen miles to the town of Talmage, then Brock, 
and Auburn (Nemaha County seat), where it 
usually flowed underneath another railroad, 
the Missouri-Pacific, down an ever-widening 
floodplain turned to fields, finally entering the 
Missouri River near Nemaha. 
The Otoe-Missourian peoples who resided 
in southeastern Nebraska before the arrival of 
the Euro-Americans did not leave us with a 
clear picture of their relationship to rivers in 
flood. Like the Euro-Americans who would 
replace them on the land, the Otoe-Missourias 
were presumably drawn to the enriched spoils 
and moisture afforded by seasonal flooding of 
rivers and creeks. Their subsistence base, un-
like that of the Euro-American farmer's, was 
not tied to a specific plot of land; it spread 
over space. During the late spring three or 
four women would go down to the creek bot-
toms and plant their corn, pumpkins, squash, 
beans, and melons. The word "Nemaha," in 
f~ct, comes from Otoe words "ne," water, and 
"maha," planting or cultivating.3 In June, when 
corn reached chest height, the entire village 
might be abandoned as the tribe went on an 
extended summer bison hunt in central Kan-
sas. The tribe would return to the village in 
time to harvest the corn. By 1800 a majority 
of their diet came from the spring and fall-
winter bison hunts.4 In addition to horticul-
ture and twice-yearly bison hunts, they also 
gathered roots and hunted for small game and 
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deer nearer home. As David J. Wishart notes, 
"the combined hunting, farming and gather-
ing cycle spread their subsistence base over a 
wide area and was a successful ecological ad-
aptation to the transitional tall-grass and 
mixed-grass environments of the Great 
Plains."5 
Adaptation is the key here, made necessary 
because the Otoe-Missourias had come to 
southeastern Nebraska in relatively recent 
times. During the seventeenth century the 
Dakota had pushed the Otoes (a Siouian 
people) from their original homeland near the 
Great Lakes. They generally migrated south-
west under the pressure of stronger tribes, un-
til by 1714 they had lodged against the Salt 
Creek tributary of the Platte near its juncture 
with the Missouri River. Here they would con-
trol a part of southeastern Nebraska that con-
tained the Little Nemaha, but they were 
prevented from further expansion by the 
Omaha to the north, the Pawnee to the west, 
and the Kansa to the south. At the turn of the 
century, the Otoe were joined by their rela-
tives, the Missouria, in a somewhat uncom-
fortable union. After being weakened by 
smallpox and under the onslaught of the Sauk 
and Fox, the Missouria had fled from their 
homeland in Missouri.6 
Wishart notes how quickly the Otoe-
Missouria (and other Indian peoples) adapted 
to their new home. What is important for us is 
that they practiced subsistence patterns that 
did not perforce set them at odds with a river's 
natural propensity to flood. They built their 
villages conservatively on secondary terraces-
expressly to remain above floodstage, locating 
them close to timber and water. 7 If their pat-
terns of movement about the landscape were 
inconvenienced at times by the river's rise (as 
during the spring runoff), they would have 
found this a natural, regular occurrence and a 
part of their pattern of living. Flooding was a 
benefit to the Otoe-Missouria-it provided 
moisture and enrichment for the soils they 
farmed on the living floodplain. This is not to 
say that the Otoe-Missouria never experienced 
the negative effects of flooding. For example, 
widespread flooding in the summer of 1844, 
which took streams from Colorado's foothills 
to the Mississippi River to record heights, de-
stroyed Otoe corn crops along the Platte. The 
point is that their subsistence base was broader 
than relying on their horticultural economy.s 
By the time the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
opened southeastern Nebraska to Euro-Ameri-
can settlement in 1854, the Otoe-Missouria 
had been forced to cede their lands in south-
eastern Nebraska through a series of treaties 
and incremental land cessations. In the treaty 
of March 1854 they agreed to move southwest 
to a rectangular parcel of land in the Blue 
River Valley.9 
By this time what would become Otoe 
County was a corridor well-traveled by set-
tlers headed west (roughly following the top 
of our T). Euro-American settlers came to the 
rolling, hilly country of southeastern Nebraska 
under two impulses: first, to exploit the rich 
agricultural potential, of the prairie, and sec-
ond, to exploit the settlers heading west-to 
service a human traffic pattern. The sloping, 
loess-covered hills, once the thick prairie sod 
was removed, had rich agricultural potential, 
and this quadrant of Nebraska did not require 
irrigation, as it received an average of over 
thirty inches of rain per year (70 percent of 
which fell in the growing season April through 
September) .10 Yet some of the earliest Euro-
Americans hoped the land might yield profits 
without going through the enormous work it 
took to make a farm. The territorial legisla-
ture allowed speculators and squatters to form 
"claim clubs," and by 1856 settlers (many of 
whom would pay for land using their warrants 
from the Mexican War) were having to move 
into central and western Otoe County to find 
unclaimed land not held by speculators. Syra-
cuse, in fact, originated-at least as a name-
due to one group of speculators. After finding 
salt marshes in the area (six miles west of 
present-day Syracuse), these speculators hoped 
to cash in on the connection of the name with 
Syracuse, New York, which was known as a 
salt center. As Nebraska was laid out on the 
township grid system, these speculators filed 
in 1856 as the "Syracuse Town Company." 
Although they advertised their lands back East, 
the effort proved unsuccessful. 11 The real town 
of Syracuse would follow from another im-
pulse, as a transportation-route service point. 
Nebraska City was incorporated in 1855 at 
a ferry point that had been established the 
year before on the Missouri. It was near the 
site of the old Fort Kearny, which had been 
abandoned in 1848. New Fort Kearny was now 
situated at the southernmost bend of the Platte, 
250 miles away; and the route between the 
two was called the Overland Trail. Within 
twenty years the railroad would follow a nearly 
identical route between Nebraska City and 
Lincoln. The route would be shortened in 
1860, saving seventy-five miles and becoming 
known as the Nebraska City-Fort Kearny Cut-
off. The first town west of Nebraska City on 
this route was Nursery Hill; it lay on the Little 
Nemaha two miles west of what would be-
come Syracuse. It was the location of a floral 
nursery (serving a New York company), sev-
eral stores, and the area's first grist mill (1868). 
This was a heavily traveled route-one settler 
claimed he had seen a hundred wagons pass 
before eight o'clock one morning. 
The new settlers of the Little Nemaha Val-
ley showed clear patterns of both cluster and 
chain migration. Many came from the Mid-
west: first Ohio, later Wisconsin and Illinois. 
There was an early and continuing pattern of 
migration from New York State, reflected in 
town names across Otoe County, not just in 
the Little Nemaha Valley, e.g., Syracuse, 
Unadilla, Palymra. There was a strong pres-
ence of German immigrants spread out across 
Otoe County; the 1870 census would show 
1,173 German-born residents out of the 
county's 12,345. By 1900 this had grown to 
2,250 out of 15, n 7. More than half of the 
German immigrants would arrive by steamer 
up the Missouri, disembarking at Nebraska 
City. Palmyra Township had a very strong 
British presence, with over a third of its popu-
lation in 1870 born in England and 10 percent 
born in Ireland. It would take time for these 
new immigrants, with cultural preferences for 
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growing particular crops, and from climates 
having different patterns of precipitation, to 
adjust to a new environmental context. 
Whether they actually adjusted to the physi-
cal constraints of the prairie environment is 
a deeper question. I argue that the valley's 
natural disasters were ultimately a factor of 
its inhabitants' nonadjustment to natural lim-
itS. 12 
Both Syracuse and Unadilla were creations 
of settlers who saw the railroad coming and 
took active measures to be sure it came their 
way. A group of five settlers residing in the 
Syracuse Township saw the possibility of mak-
ing a town via the development of the railroad 
that was to be built between Nebraska City 
and Lincoln. In 1870 they donated 240 acres 
to the Midland Pacific Railroad to bring it 
through section sixteen of the township.13 
Syracuse prospered and Nursery Hill slowly 
withered. A land agent originally from 
Unadilla, New York, having relatives who 
worked for the Midland Pacific and had "in-
side information" about the future railroad 
route, platted Unadilla, Nebraska, in May 
1871. Presumably his efforts paid off. Main 
Street soon followed the curved line of the 
railroad tracks. 14 The railroad was drawn both 
by the subsidy of humans (free land) and, per-
haps of equal importance, by nature's provi-
sion. Gilbert White described this latter factor 
in 1945. In rough terrain railroads followed 
"the easiest possible grades for the longest 
possible distances."15 Not only were grades of 
import for the railroad engineers but wide 
floodplains allowed the possibility of low cur-
vature. D. W. Washburn, a locating engineer 
for the Jay Gould lines in the southwest in-
str~cted, "drainage, drainage, DRAINAGE. 
The drainage and location of the drainage is 
the framework on which you must hang your 
location. "16 Dry and gentle floodplains do 
not stay that way, of course; it is not in the 
nature of a river to do so. 
The Midland Pacific followed the earlier 
traffic patterns through the area, ones that 
humans used for the same physical reasons. 
White described a typical result of railroad 
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presence: "Highways and urban occupance 
have developed flood-plain locations in many 
instances in order to be near some railway 
rather than because of any other advantages 
of the flood plain."17 And this describes suc-
cinctly the development of Syracuse, Unadilla, 
and Auburn-these towns grew up around the 
depot. The railroads (certainly prior to hard-
surfaced highways) were their outlets to the 
world. The towns suffered from the same prob-
lem that beset the railroad from time to time-
the river acted in its nature, but not for a 
while, and not until humans had made real 
efforts to aid it on its way. 
The river appears somewhat abstract in the 
early accounts, possibly because it had a re-
stricted value as commodity. As it was not 
used for irrigation or as a source of drinking 
water, perhaps it lay outside of the purview of 
farmers who were settling the area. Its utility 
as power for grist and flour mills was restricted 
to a few proprietors (although the larger com-
munity certainly benefited, and some had gran-
diose plans for water-generated power). But 
most of the farm produce was soon heading 
out of the valley into a world market. The 
river as hindrance steadily diminished as the 
railroad became important for transportation 
and as bridges replaced fords (the big iron 
bridge right below Unadilla dated from 1874; 
it remained until the Big Flood took it in 
1950).18 Residents appreciated the river as a 
place to swim, particularly in the pools cre-
ated behind the mill dams. This river was fun 
and useful, but it was not so much fun or so 
useful as to loom large in the new natives' 
field of view. 
Oldtimers remembered prairie grasses as 
high as six to eight feet in the Nemaha Valley. 
Probably apocryphal were the stories of chas-
ing deer into the thick grass and catching them 
when they became tangled. 19 The land, once 
plowed, made good farms. The history here, as 
in so many places on the Great Plains, may be 
telescoped into the telling phrase provided by 
Donald Worster: "The sod had been destroyed 
to make farms to grow wheat to get cash."20 It 
was an effective transformation, as the land 
produced vast quantities of corn and wheat. 
Census records depict both the population 
growth and the expansion of agricultural pro-
duction in southeast Nebraska between 1860 
and 1890 (Table 1). The rapid expansion of 
corn production in Otoe County between 1870 
and 1880, from roughly 600,000 to 3.5 million 
bushels, illustrates the rapidity with which the 
prairie was being turned to make cropland. It 
also shows why the floodplain dwellers (such 
as those in Syracuse) suffered from increased 
severity of flooding. The decline in wheat pro-
duction between 1880 and 1890 was a factor 
not only of higher profitability for corn per 
acre but an attenuation of cultural preferences 
for growing wheat rather than corn (which 
some immigrants, such as British and Germans, 
brought with them from the Old Country).21 
The existence of the mill at Nursery Hill by 
1868 and one soon established upriver at 
Unadilla in 1875 give additional evidence that 
the land was being settled thickly enough that 
there was need for them. The Syracuse Mill-
ing Company would arrive in the late 1890s, 
replacing the Unadilla mill. 22 
In 1878,350 carloads of grain and 100 car-
loads of stock left Syracuse. Three years later, 
in a relatively poor year for farming, the total 
had increased to 641 carloads: corn, 323; swine, 
130; cattle, 94; wheat, 54; barley, 34; and rye, 
11.24 The tendency was to expand production 
with little regard for the long-term conse-
quences. This would come back to haunt them, 
as it did so graphically in the 1950 flood, when 
freshly tilled soil on unterraced, sloping land 
in the very beginning of the growing season 
ended up deposited thickly on floodplains. But 
as we have seen, the removal of the thick 
thatch of sod altered hydrologic characteris-
tics of the land. 25 
FLOODS AND RESPONSES, 1883-1950 
As farmers in Little Nemaha Valley put 
more and more land to crops in the 1870s and 
1880s, the people of the valley started having 
increasingly severe problems with flooding. 
When general rains struck southeast Nebraska 
in June 1883, which the Syracuse Journal head-
lined as "The Heaviest Rain Ever Known in 
this Section," the Little Nemaha near Syra-
cuse "overflowed and spread about a mile over 
the valley." Families had to evacuate homes; 
the floodwaters on the south of Syracuse came 
up to Third Street. Several people nearly 
drowned riding horses across water, and a team 
of horses mired, proving ineffective in one 
rescue. Five townsmen had apparently just 
built a boat, christened the Billy Powell. It was 
used to good effect in rescuing a number of 
people. One of the men, a Mr. Beesley, found 
it so handy, in fact, he bought it the next week 
"so as to be prepared for floods in the future." 
The Burlington and Missouri Railroad (which 
had purchased the Midland Pacific in 1877) 
lost bridges, had whole sections wrecked, and 
lost ten thousand feet of track at Syracuse. 
Towns downriver such as Brock, Talmage, and 
Nemaha City suffered flood damage. The lo-
cal news column in the Syracuse paper, always 
hoping to strike a lighter note, reported, "On 
account of the almost incessant rains of late, 
the beautiful (?) weeds are flourishing."26 
During the next week railroad crews began 
patching up the line. Then, a storm of even 
greater intensity hit Syracuse and vicinity. The 
Syracuse Journal reported the result of one 
night's six and a half inches of rain: "When 
morning came the streams and valleys were 
one wide seething sea, bridges were swept away 
in all directions, and communications and 
travel both by horse and rail rendered nearly 
impossible." Railroad track that had just been 
"patched up" washed away, the train could 
not get past Unadilla, and the area lost more 
bridges: "The wooden bridge on the road to 
Nursery Hill, broke in the middle and dropped 
into the creek a sorry wreck."27 There was no 
report if Mr. Beesley used his new Billy Powell. 
Damage was not confined to the built envi-
ronment; it hit farmland as well. But, again, 
the local paper chose to give the story a posi-
tive spin: 
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In many places in the valley the damage to 
crops was great, but strange to say in some 
instances the gain exceeded the loss. On 
the Van Riper farm, though 100 acres of 
grain was more or less damaged, yet the 
sediment that settled in the low places did 
his farm more good than the loss to his 
crops, so that on the whole he is better off 
than before the floods. 28 
This passage indicates two things: obviously, 
some recognized that a normally functioning 
nature did produce benefits for humans, but in 
comparison with later flood sediment dam-
age, it indicates that a good bit of the prairie 
had not yet been turned to cropland (else Mr. 
Van Riper probably would have gained too 
much for his own good). This is also in line 
with the census data, showing a rise in Otoe 
County's corn production between 1880 and 
1890 from 3.5 million to 5.3 million bushels 
(Table 1). The second point of interest is that 
the writer apparently gave little thought to 
where that rich sediment might be coming 
from-his focus was on crop loss, not topsoil 
loss. Two Nebraska scientists may have re-
cently given us an indication as to why: "Soil 
loss is especially tragic because, at least in 
Nebraska, it is very nearly invisible. In gen-
eral, erosion in our state does not take the 
form of gullies, as it does, for example, in the 
South. Much of it is result of sheet or ephem-
eral erosion where one pass with a field culti-
vator can completely mask it."29 
By 1906 the residents along the upper river 
had enough experience with a series of minor 
floods that they convinced the owner of 
Unadilla Roller Mills that his dam was to 
bl~me. As he had stopped using water power 
to run his mill in 1897 when he purchased a 
gasoline engine, he acceded to their demands 
and blew up the dam.30 It did not stop the 
floods. 
Two years after the dam's destruction an-
other big flood hi t Unadilla; this time the dam-
age was more serious than ever. It had started 
raining heavily Sunday night, 5 July 1908, hard 
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TABLE 1 
GROWTH OF THE LITTLE NEMAHA VALLEY 1860-189023 
1860 1870 1880 1890 
Otoe County population 4,211 12,345 15,727 25,403 
Syracuse [Township] population [640] 510 [1,138] 728 [1,495] 
Corn (in bushels) 632,160 3,591,019 5,315,708 
Wheat (in bushels) 175,058 248,364 178,625 
Nemaha County Population 3,139 7,593 10,451 12,930 
Corn (in bushels) 224,659 2,942,770 4,084,020 
Wheat (in bushels) 33,790 273,708 161,528 
Note: In 1860, only township population was recorded. By 1870, both town and the larger 
township was recorded in the census. 
enough, in fact, that members of the Chris-
tian Church canceled services and headed 
home or stayed with friends in town. It rained 
heavily all night long. The next morning, John 
Doyle was with a group of people at the lum-
beryard when he received a telephone call at 
about six o'clock. Someone warned him that 
he had better get his family out of his house, 
which was between the railroad tracks and the 
river (as were six or seven other homes). He 
was apparently still arguing over the relative 
danger of the situation (maintaining that his 
house had survived several floods), when some-
one arrived at the yard with the news that 
Doyle's house was floating down the river. Mr. 
Doyle ran down the railroad tracks, chasing 
his home, "trying to shout instructions and 
encouragement to his family." This lasted 
about three-quarters of a mile. Then his house 
came apart, and he dove in to save them. All 
six in the house died. A number of other homes 
situated too near the river were also de-
stroyed.3! This time water rose as far as Main 
Street in SyracuseY The learning curve on 
the nature of this river was proving very steep. 
By the mid-teens, some of the valley's resi-
dents judged they had suffered enough from 
the river and it was time for more direct ac-
tion. They formed drainage districts with the 
purview of reducing floods. For several years 
these districts worked on ambitious channel-
ization projects on two sections of the Little 
Nemaha, a fourteen-mile stretch between Syra-
cuse and Talmage, and a forty-mile stretch 
from the Nemaha County line to the Missouri 
River at Nemaha. Neither project was met 
with enthusiasm from those whose property 
the ditches traversed. Some landowners sold 
out when they found the ditch might come 
their way and others refused to let the ditch 
cross their property. Huge land- and boat-based 
dredges were used to create these nearly 
straight channels.33 Syracusans hoped that this 
would improve the river's dilatory behavior 
in draining the upper river. The problem as 
they saw it was in all that senseless weaving, 
meandering time the river took in getting rid 
of excess water. If this solution seems 
Herculean for such a small neck of the river, 
presumably it was a natural bit of reverse engi-
neering from their broader water experience. 
Nebraskans had been constructing ambitious 
ditches farther northwest for several decades 
to bring irrigation water to fields that had 
none.14 Why not make a ditch to take water 
away from where they had too much? Of course, 
in doing so, as we have seen, the valley's resi-
dents were opening themselves to increased 
danger in the future. 
This began a new phase in the valley resi-
dents' relationship to their river in flood: from 
now on most of their efforts would be directed 
toward engineering a safe river. After a storm 
in the summer of 1917 , shortly after the Syra-
cuse "Ditch" was completed, the paper con-
gratulated the community on the wisdom of 
its efforts, headlined as "Efficiency of Ditch 
Pronounced Perfect." The story read as fol-
lows: "The efficiency of the drainage ditch 
was again demonstrated last week. The mouth 
of the ditch where it joins the Nemaha be-
came clogged, and but for the prompt action 
of Mr. Meeker and others who dislodged the 
debris with dynamite, the bottoms would have 
been flooded, but for the ditch."35 The author 
missed the point of the story. The efficiency of 
the ditch was not perfect. His assessment dis-
plays a characteristically over-optimistic as-
sessment of using technology to solve nature's 
"imperfections." It also demonstrates an in-
ability, or an unwillingness, to recognize the 
limitations of their technology, even at a most 
basic level. 
While the Little Nemaha flooded periodi-
cally between 1917 and mid-century, the flood 
of 1950 dramatically revealed the harmful ef-
fects of the inhabitants' land-use practices and 
the limitations of their engineering efforts. The 
Soil Conservation Service's postflood survey 
(which was limited to agriculture and county 
roads, as the Corps of Engineers was respon-
sible for assessing municipal, industrial, and 
state and federal highway damage) determined 
the 8-9 May 1950 storm and flood caused $53 
million in damages. Of this they judged fully 
88 percent resulted from "sheet erosion in the 
uplands in the flood area." Bare, freshly tilled 
fields awaiting corn suffered severe erosion, 
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particularly on sloping land. Wheat fields did 
much better but still lost as much as an inch of 
soil. Oat fields, with plants "barely past the 
emergence stage," eroded heavily, sometimes 
losing more than two inches. The damage on 
the lowlands was the reverse: "Ironically, much 
of this soil, which constitutes such a vital re-
source in its position on the uplands, formed a 
suffocating blanket over thousands of acres of 
growing crops along bottomlands on the lower 
reaches of streams where it was deposited in 
some instances up to depths of five feet."36 
Farmers on the floodplain probably would not 
have characterized the siruation as "ironic"; 
their expressions would have more likely 
tended toward "tragic." 
The Soil Conservation Service based its 
assessment of damage on an amortization of 
reduced crop yields at $5,183,537 per crop 
year. This would occur yearly "until such time 
as steps are taken to restore it to its former 
level of productivity .... When considered in 
terms of the present or capitalized value of 
the loss in production to the landowner, the 
total loss due to sheet erosion adds up to 
$46,661,775. "37 Restoration, here, is in terms 
of crop production. The topsoil, the wind-
blown loess from the Rocky Mountains that 
had taken tens of millions of years to form, 
was gone for good. The Soil Conservation 
Service noted that while the monetary figure 
was "startling," the accumulation of damages 
from past storms (before their efforts in imple-
menting soil conservation techniques) would 
have been an even "more staggering figure." 
That was true, but a more interesting and 
thought-provoking comparison would have 
been with the land prior to the removal of 
sod. 
A comprehensive Congressional report 
published nearly a decade and a half later, in 
1965, revealed inadequacies in the valley 
residents' grand technological solution to 
flooding; the channelization had done both 
more and less than it was originally intended 
to do. Channelization created its own hydrau-
lic characteristics. As intended, it allowed 
greater water flow, but this increased the rate 
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of erosion both of the channel bed and stream 
banks. The result was, as the Corps of Engi-
neers report later found, "Stream erosion had 
greatly enlarged this original channel both in 
width and, particularly in the upper reaches, 
in depth." As the river continued to cut down, 
it created a steeper slope. The result: "The 
channel enlargement, the river gradient, and 
the drainage pattern have resulted in unbal-
anced capacities." At Syracuse river bankfull 
occurred at about 30,500 cubic feet per sec-
ond (cps) of flow. Near Talmage this increased 
to 50,000 cpg, but then the channel narrowed 
and the gradient moderated so that at Auburn 
bankfull capacity of the river was only 26,500 
CpS.38 The channel constriction near Auburn 
meant that water, increasing in velocity as it 
traveled down the channel from Syracuse, 
would "pile up" as it approached Auburn. And 
piling up in a channel meant flooding. Below 
Auburn, the Corps study reported flooding 
would occur every two or three years. While 
the Syracusans had apparently solved their 
town's flooding problem by their ditching, they 
had increased the danger downstream. Al-
though the project had been intended to de-
crease danger of flooding, it actually resulted 
in less safety, as residents, particularly along 
the upper reaches of the valley, expanded 
settlement and farming in the floodplain. 
When big storms arrived as they did in 1950 
and 1993, the scale of disaster would be just 
that much greater. 
Human transformation of the prairie to 
farms in the Little Nemaha Valley had serious 
interrelated consequences for both the land 
and the river. 39 As farmers removed more and 
more of the thick prairie sod, there was less 
vegetation to retard runoff and more water 
ended up more quickly in streams that fed the 
Little Nemaha, causing faster rises and higher 
peak flows. 40 Of course, southeastern Nebraska 
farmers were not turning the prairie because 
of a hatred of grass; they were turning it to 
make crops for market. And they were not 
turning it to let it remain bare. But for a good 
part of the year it would be bare, or with crops 
just peeking above ground, as they found to 
their sorrow in the early May flood of 1950. 
While land in crops held water much better 
than did bare land, it rejected water much 
more than did land left to sod (or planted in 
certain other nonnative grasses). The signifi-
cant point is that row crops compared to sod 
had 500 to 1,500 percent more runoffY 
A RIVER'S NATURE 
When residents of the valley attempted to 
correct flooding brought about by their land-
use practices, they did so through channel 
modifications. In doing this they were violat-
ing a river basin's natural processes. Perhaps it 
did not occur to them that the river had pur-
pose in making all those time-wasting, sense-
less meanders that they were so anxious to 
correct. Most of the time a river flows low in 
its channel. Several times a year it flows at 
three-quarters depth, and about twice a year 
at bankfull. Flows above this level are not 
contained within the channel but flow out 
over the floodplain (overbank flows). Hydrolo-
gists Luna Leopold and Thomas Maddock Jr. 
explained in 1958 why a river does not re-
main within its channel: "a series of compli-
cated actions and reactions of water and 
sediment leading to a type of equilibrium be-
tween river water and river channel requires 
the existence of a flood plain."42 The flood-
plain is built by the river as it swings laterally. 
The less rapidly a river downcuts through a 
channel, the more it swings. Hydraulic forces 
act to establish an equilibrium between what 
a drainage area offers in potential energy and 
what the river is able to transport in water and 
debris, "When a given reach of river attains 
near-stability of elevation and gradient," a 
condition railroads are particularly fond of, as 
we have seen, "then lateral widening of the 
valley becomes the dominant process."43 As 
the river channel bends, water on the outside 
speeds up, eroding bank material, while water 
on the inside slows and, as it does so, drops its 
suspended load. This repeated deposition on 
the inside of river bends creates the flood-
plain. 
The height of the flood-plain surface is not 
determined by the truly extraordinary floods 
because of their rarity, but by the more com-
mon floods of moderate size. That is why 
the river channel is not built with banks 
high enough to contain the unusual flood. 
It is axiomatic, then, that during the un-
usual flood the flood plain is truly a part of 
the river channe1.44 
Forty years later, Leopold theorized why 
rivers and streams of all sizes tend to form the 
same meandering pattern, and do so to a de-
gree that even he, as a geomorphologist, found 
surprising. He describes a river as a classic case 
of an "open system"-one that has a continu-
ing source of potential energy (here, water to 
drain from elevation). Leopold tells us that an 
open system has a "tendency toward two con-
ditions: that of minimum of work and that of 
uniform distribution of work or energy utiliza-
tion." Because an open system cannot achieve 
both conditions at once, there is a compro-
mise between the two. A compromise, here, 
indicates a minimization of variance, "a con-
dition known as the most probable state. The 
compromise toward the most probable state is 
exhibited in channel meanders."45 The reason 
that rivers and streams assume the "s" shape 
of the sine-generated curve is that this shape 
represents the most uniform distribution of 
change along the curve. The result, expressed 
in this contest between water and land, is that 
"by deposition and erosion, the river assumes 
a pattern that is both the most probable and 
the one having the smallest sum of the squares 
of deviations."46 
Here emerge several crucial ideas for the 
history of human alterations of the Little 
Nemaha Valley. Most basic is the concept of a 
floodplain. Leopold states that, "the flood plain 
is part of the river channel."47 While this flood-
plain-which widened from a half mile to two 
miles on the river below Syracuse-may be 
divided for hydrologic purposes into the "liv-
ing floodplain" and an inactive or "historic 
floodplain," we might just as easily speak of 
the floodplain as being the normally dry part 
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of the river. Part of the conceptual problem 
for those who settle near rivers is that they 
consider the floodplain separate from the river. 
While townsmen and farmers might choose to 
live in a floodplain, surely they would not want 
to settle in a river. 
Leopold's scientific profile of a river helps 
to explain why human alterations in the Little 
Nemaha Valley-destroying the prairie, then 
straightening and shortening the river-cre-
ated a particularly dangerous, unstable situa-
tion. In so radically changing the hydrologic 
characteristics of the land, settlers created an 
imbalance in this river system between its 
upland energy potential and the "compromise" 
of its downstream channel profile in relation 
to its water and debris transport. Upland farm-
ers were awakening the river; it would now 
have to reach a new downstream compromise 
(which it did through flooding). In "improv-
ing" their river through channel modifications, 
the valley's residents were setting a straight-
ened channel at war with the river's natural 
tendency toward meanders and floodplain cre-
ation. The river would predictably try to cre-
ate a larger floodplain. This was a dangerous, 
essentially unrecognized, situation. 
With the self-evident "efficiency" of their 
drainage ditch in mind, farmers and towns-
people were safe to plow and build-or so they 
thought. As larger floods proved so disas-
trously, particularly in 1950 and 1993, they 
were not safe. Their ditch had given them a 
false sense of security that allowed them to 
expand development. In making this develop-
ment on the floodplain, to great effort and 
expense, they were escalating their problems 
geometrically, as their river would act force-
fully to express itself when the big storms came. 
With new development, and a new scale of 
damage the next time around, the solutions 
they would ponder would have to be corre-
spondingly larger. 
The history of Euro-American land use and 
settlement patterns in the Little Nemaha Val-
ley provides a clear example of one way in 
which humans have created natural disasters. 
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In not understanding, and then ignoring or 
resisting the nature of the prairie that had 
been conditioned by its western skies through 
the ages, humans here created their own trag-
edies. By placing the economic value of their 
system of commercial agriculture as the prime 
consideration in their relationship with na-
ture, and then only attempting piecemeal solu-
tions on the periphery of this system, the 
valley's inhabitants-farmers and towns-
people-were setting themselves up for disas-
ter. They turned the sod and planted fencerow 
to fencerow, while they created towns in a 
river's floodplain. Even as the Soil Conserva-
tion Service during and after the 1930s pres-
sured farmers to use better soil conservation 
practices, and even when it warned that the 
land was already approaching diminishing re-
turns in steeper sections, farmers resisted 
change.48 Even today, the Nebraska Natural 
Resources Commission reports that 43 per-
cent of Nebraska's cropland needs better ero-
sion control, with about 34 percent eroding at 
a rate damaging its ability to produce.49 As we 
have seen, farmers also altered the hydrologic 
characteristics of the land, resulting in in-
creased flooding and increased severity of 
flooding. While townsfolk would alter their 
urban settlements to a degree, eventually not 
rebuilding in areas subject to repeated flood-
ing,50 their preference was to change the na-
ture of their river. This they did and then they 
placed too much trust in their efforts. But water 
and gravity acted according to their natures, 
altering the marvels of human engineering. 
Even when humans were subjected to the con-
sequences of their actions on the land, they 
did not recognize that they were responsible 
for this type of "natural" disaster. Nature here, 
as everywhere, continues to teach its lessons. 
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